I Want Your Word: Inside Ransomware Negotiation — Trust, Tactics, and Technical Complexity
Summary
In this detailed analysis, we dive into a ransomware negotiation involving the infamous REvil group and the victim. Once the attackers encrypted the victim’s local network and exfiltrated sensitive data, both sides entered a tense back-and-forth chat to sort things out. Some of the big topics were the attackers' money demands, what technical assurances they could offer, and the victim's important request for a promise that they wouldn't come back for another attack. This case shows how psychological tactics, technical leverage, and building trust all play a vital role in dealing with ransomware situations.
Case Background and Initial Compromise
The attack started with a targeted spam campaign that included malicious attachments sent to the victim's employees. When one of the users opened the infected file, the REvil group
deployed their ransomware payload, stealing authentication credentials and escalating their access across the corporate network.By exploiting a vulnerable server with Remote Code Execution (RCE) capabilities, they compromised a domain controller and installed persistent tools, including keyloggers and antivirus modifications to thwart detection.
In the end, the attackers encrypted important data from all over the system, signaling the breach by activating their locking software with minimal disruption at first. Their goal was to create pressure by threatening to publish the stolen info and causing ongoing damage to operations.
Negotiation Timeline
The negotiation began with the REvil group’s initial $500,000 ransom demand and a stern warning about imminent data publication:
“The price to unlock is $500,000. Now we're keeping it a secret, but if you do not reply us within 3 days it will be posted on our news-site.”
The victim showed openness to resolution by requesting proof of data access and decryption capabilities. The attacker complied by providing sample files and links, demonstrating a willingness to engage in negotiations.
When the victim attempted to negotiate a discount citing financial limitations, the attacker initially offered a 20% reduction for prompt payment but firmly rejected lower offers:
“My boss can offer 20% discount for fast payment.”
However, as the victim outlined their maximum capacity (~$280k), they strategically sought critical assurances beyond payment terms. This included confirmations of decryptor functionality, full data deletion, post-payment support, and the vital promise that the attackers would not strike again. A direct quote captures the victim’s emphasis on trust and future security:
“...I do not want to be attacked again, so I want your word that REvil will not attack us again and that you can tell me what I need to do to block whatever way you come in.”
The attacker agreed to these terms and revised the price accordingly. Payment was arranged through a bitcoin broker with detailed instructions provided for decryptor usage and advised procedural safeguards (e.g., running as administrator, disabling antivirus).
Post-payment, the attacker offered a technical overview of the breach — revealing a sophisticated multi-step intrusion spanning from phishing to lateral movement, keylogger installation, and antivirus evasion. Despite agreeing to provide a full listing of stolen files and confirmation of data deletion, the attacker claimed the file list had been deleted alongside the victim’s data.
Technical Analysis
The REvil attackers utilized a classic ransomware attack chain beginning with spear phishing campaigns distributing malware-laden files. Following initial compromise, credential harvesting allowed expansive network traversal and privilege escalation, culminating in domain controller encryption and widespread data exfiltration.
The attackers’ instructions on the decryptor usage reflect a nuanced understanding of endpoint environments, recommending administrator privileges and antivirus suspension to avoid interference during decryption. The dual interface — GUI and command line — provided operational flexibility.
Notably, the victim reported functional issues with the decrypted Domain Controllers, highlighting a potential risk of partial system damage during encryption or recovery, an often overlooked technical consequence of ransomware intrusions.
Mind Games and Strategies in Negotiation
The dialogue highlights deliberate psychological maneuvers from both sides. The attacker cultivates pressure through a ticking clock and the threat of public data release to leverage the victim’s fear of reputational and financial damage:
“Think about the financial damage to your stock price from this publication.”
The attacker also maintains a businesslike and cooperative tone, portraying themselves as pragmatic operators rather than ruthless aggressors:
“But don't panic! We are in business, not in war.”
The victim takes a practical and realistic approach, clearly setting boundaries. Requests for decryptor samples and proof of data deletion serve both as due diligence and confidence-building. Most critically, the victim explicitly demands a guarantee that the REvil group will not attack again — addressing a profound need for long-term security beyond this single episode:
“I want your word that REvil will not attack us again...”
This moment reflects the victim’s attempt to shift the interaction from transactional extortion to a fragile, trust-based agreement — a difficult but necessary psychological pivot in ransomware negotiations.
Full Transcript
FULL TRANSCRIPT:
Attacker: Hello,
We are REvil Group.
We want to inform that your company local network have been hacked and encrypted. We have all your local network data. The Price to unlock is $500,000. Now we're keeping it a secret, but if you do not reply us within 3 days it will be posted on our news-site. Think about the financial damage to your stock price from this publication. In case of successful negotiations we guarantee that you will get decryptors for all your machines, non recoverable removal of downloaded data and security report on how you were hacked to fix your vulnerabilities. We hope that you can correctly assess the risks for your company.
You can find more information about REvil group in Google.
Posting on our blog and further publications in the media will lead to significant losses for your company: court and government fines, data recovery, loss of reputation, abandonment of clients, drop in limits.
But don't panic! We are in business, not in war.
We can unblock your data and keep everything secret. All we need is a ransom.
In this case, you also get: a security report, a complete tree of compromised data files, permanently deleting downloaded data, support with tips on unlocking and protecting.
Victim: Hello
We are interested in resolving this situation. Can you provide some sample information on what files were accessed and taken?
Attacker: Hello , wait for answer
Victim: Some sample file for decryption test
Attacker: file
Attacker: file
Attacker: file
Attacker: Extract:[redacted]
Download:
[redacted]
https://privatlab.com/s/v/[redacted]
https://privatlab.com/s/d/[redacted]#delete
Victim: Thank you kindly. What can we do about discount of the price? 500 is beyond our capacity to pay.
Attacker: my boss can offer 20% discount for fast payment
Victim: Hello - Your website was unreachable today.
We looked into available on-hand funds but we cannot do 400k. We have $124k available on-hand that we can pay you for this situation. Can I give you my email in case this chat goes down again? how do we talk? How do I know if we pay that your site will not come down and we never get confirmation of data being deleted or the decryptors?
Attacker: Our site will not be disabled, you do not need to worry about it.
But your offer is too low, we are ready to take one more small step forward, but 300k is our last offer.
Victim: Hello - 300k is not possible for us. We do not have that kind of cash on hand even if we maxed our personal credit cards. I need to go back and figure out what we can do.
Attacker: The price below is not interesting to us
Victim: We spoke to a few crypto places and with their fees, we can go up to 280k but in btc only. we are short 20k we cannot make it up sorry. Also, I want to ensure if we reach agreement, that you will come through on your side on the promises you are making. specifically, we need you to give us the decryptors and that they will work and if there are technical support issues, that you will help resolve. Also, that all our data will be deleted and you will provide some confirmation of deletion and I would also like to see the full listing of what you took. This is a lot of money for our company, you have to understand and I do not want to be attacked again, so I want your word that REvil will not attack us again and that you can tell me what I need to do to block whatever way you come in. If you are in agreement tell me what is "Bitcoin Wallet ID to send BTC" as my broker suggested. I need your assurance though.
Attacker: okay we agree and confirm
Attacker: btc enabled , price update
Victim: Hello - ok thank you, we are working with a bitcoins broker to do transfer today
Attacker: ok
Victim: Hello - the broker just sent 7.670 bitcoins. Please confirm and provide the decryptor, thanks
Victim: Hello - ok, we downloaded the decryptor. Please send the full listing of what you took, how we were breached and the confirmation of deletion of our data. Thank you.
Attacker: Wait for answer
Attacker: To use a decryptor run it as administrator and turn off antivirus before.
You can use a decryptor as gui application or through cmd.
CMD commands:
UniversalDecryptor.exe -full
UniversalDecryptor.exe -path "C:\folder"
UniversalDecryptor.exe -file "C:\folder\file.txt.random_ext"
* decryptor with -full option will decrypt all with default params.
If you use it as gui application, mI recommend you choose "create backups" option. If you use decryptor without this option, you should not interrupt decryption process, otherwise some files will be irreversibly damaged.
Attacker: file
Attacker: file
Victim: Hello - thanks. Can you also provide the full listing of what you took, and how we were breached, appreciated
Attacker: Full listing was deleted with all your files
Attacker: Spam attack
Attacker: 1) A spam campaign with a virus file were sent to employees of your domain
2) Once user clicked the file, our virus payload was installed on the computer
3) Using special tools the computer was scanned and all user authorization data
4) This authorization data was used to access to the [redacted] network remotely
5) Next we scanned your network and found a vulnerable server with RCE, we used this RCE to execute our payload and gather full access to the server
6) Next we used special security tools to dump all possible passwords from the server
7) We used those passwords to gather access to other network elements until we accessed your domain controller
8) Specially designed keyloggers were installed to the IT stuff machines, which helped us to gain access to the whole IT infra
9) We modified your antivirus configuration the way, it would not detect our presence on the IT network
10) After gaining all possible IT access data, we also found the way to connect to the remaining branches of the company
11) As soon as we gathered access to all the IT network, we used specially crafted tools to collect all valuable data
12) Upon data fetch completion, we launched our locking software across some on your IT systems, we didn't put much pressure on it, just wanted you to know that your data was leaked.
Victim: Hello - thanks
Victim: We have a technical question - we've decrypted the Domain Controllers DC01 and DC02, but we're having issues with them as they are not functioning as Domain Controllers. Is it possible these were damaged in some way during the breach? Could you tell us know how to fix them? thanksSummary
Ransomware negotiations involve a complex mix of technical, financial, and psychological factors. Victims must verify data compromise and test decryptor functionality before considering payment to build trust and reduce risks. Open and honest communication about financial limitations may enable reduced ransom amounts, especially in high-pressure situations. Demanding clear assurances—such as confirmation of data deletion, post-payment support, and guarantees against repeat attacks—provides some measure of safety in the recovery phase.
Technically, ransomware can cause harm beyond just file encryption; for example, systems like domain controllers may remain impaired even after decryption, highlighting the need for expert forensic analysis and thorough recovery planning. Psychologically, both attackers and victims often adopt a business-like tone to humanize negotiations, requiring victims to carefully balance caution with cooperation.