The Middleman Paradox: When the Victim is Just a Reseller

"All customers say so."

It’s a blunt, cynical comment from a ransomware operator who has heard all the excuses before and knows them well.

In this transcript, we aren’t watching a panicked company try to save its data. We are watching a middleman try to save a margin. The victim claims to have backups. The attacker claims to have patience. And in the middle, a negotiation unfolds that is less about the value of data and more about the price of doing business.

The Backup Bluff vs. The Patient Attacker

The negotiation opens with a classic power play. The victim does not start with a plea for help; they start with a declaration of independence.

"The customer's backup was not encrypted, the customer had the backup, and only lost a day's worth of data"

On paper, this should end the negotiation. If the backups are clean and the data loss is minimal, why is the victim here? The attacker knows this contradiction well. Their response is immediate and bored:

"All customers say so"

They don't argue the technicalities. They simply refuse to believe the narrative. If you truly had backups, you wouldn't be asking for a test file. And yet, the victim persists:

"Send the test file first"

This is the first sign that things aren’t as solid as they seemed. The victim claims to be safe, yet demands proof of decryption. The attacker, sensing they have the upper hand despite the victim's show of confidence, makes them wait.

"The technician is not online, please wait patiently"

"Be patient, the admin should be right back"

It is a subtle power move. You claim you don't need us? Fine. Then you can wait for us.

The Pivot: From Victim to Broker

Once the file is sent and the silence breaks, the negotiation shifts gears. The victim drops the "I am the company" persona and reveals their true role: the Incident Response (IR) broker.

"This price is too expensive, give a discount, I will confirm tomorrow whether the customer has a backup"

The attacker sees right through it, telling the negotiator to manage their own client rather than begging for a lower price:

"You should be trying to get your clients instead of asking me"

But the victim leans into the broker identity to justify their lowball offer:

"I understand, but the customer thinks the price is too expensive, and others ask you, 10,000USD I will get the customer"

This is the Middleman Paradox. The negotiator is trying to arbitrage the ransom. They need a price low enough to mark up for the client (or fit within a strict budget), but high enough to satisfy the criminal. They are stuck between a stubborn attacker and a tight‑budget client.

The attacker offers a 16% discount with an expiration date, trying to force urgency. The victim counters with $10,000. The attacker refuses:

"no. 20000 USD could be accepted"

The gap is $10,000—a trivial amount in enterprise ransomware, but a massive percentage for a broker trying to close a deal on thin margins.

"This Is Not Interesting For Us"

Most negotiators fear threats. They fear the "we will publish" line. But here, the attacker uses a different weapon: patience. When the victim pushes for $15,000, the attacker snaps:

"no... I can offer 25000 USD and it's best price"

They actually raise the price back up from their previous $20k float to $25k. It is a punishment for lowballing.

Victim: "The customer budget is out, 10000usd ok?"

Attacker: "this is not interesting for us"

This phrase—"not interesting"—is devastating. It signals that the victim has found the floor. The attacker has calculated their overhead, their risk, and their time, and decided that $10,000 is simply not worth the effort of sending the decryptor.

"It was said before - 25000 USD"

They are willing to walk away with nothing rather than accept a lowball offer. For a broker, this is a nightmare scenario. You cannot negotiate with someone who doesn't care if they get paid.

The Loyalty Card: "We Have Settled More Than $100,000"

Desperate to bridge the gap, the victim tries a new angle: volume pricing.

"I've heard from customers that other middlemen have already received a discount of about $10000 and I need the lowest discount to get customers"

Then, they play the loyalty card:

"Please give us the lowest price, after all, we have also settled more than $100,000 order with you"

It is a surreal moment. The victim is reminding the criminal of their "good standing" as a repeat customer. They are essentially saying: I am a good distributor of your product. Don't squeeze me on this one deal.

It highlights the dark economy of ransomware recovery. There are firms that pay these groups so often they expect "frequent flyer" status. But the attacker is unmoved.

"this is last price, no lower"

The "loyalty" bought them nothing but a hard stop.

The Anchor Holds

The victim, realizing the $10,000 dream is dead, finally capitulates to the reality of the floor.

"Is the 20000USD mentioned earlier okay?"

They are checking if the punishment price of $25k is real, or if they can still scrape by with the $20k offer mentioned minutes prior.

Victim: "What is the final price? 20000USD?"

Attacker: "20000 USD"

The negotiation ends not with a handshake, but with a confirmation of the anchor. The attacker successfully pulled the victim up from $10k to $20k, doubling the payout simply by being willing to say "no" and threatening to walk away.

Why This Negotiation Stands Out

This transcript is a dry, brutal lesson in market dynamics. It strips away the drama of data leaks and reputation destruction and exposes the transaction for what it is: a haggle over margins.

The victim tried to use the "I have backups" script, but failed to commit to it. The attacker used patience as a strategic tool, proving that sometimes the strongest move is to look bored.

And most importantly, it exposes the "Middleman Trap." When you are negotiating for a client, your budget is not flexible. The attacker knows this. They know you need the deal more than they do.

This negotiation is a reminder:

• The "Backup" bluff only works if you walk. If you claim you have data but stay in the chat asking for discounts, you have revealed your hand.
• Volume means nothing to criminals. Citing past payments of $100,000 did not yield a discount on the current deal. There is no loyalty program in ransomware.
• Patience wins. The attacker’s refusal to engage with the $10,000 offer ("not interesting for us") forced the victim to double their bid.
• The "Punishment" Raise. Briefly raising the price to $25k served as a warning shot, making the $20k "compromise" feel like a relief rather than a loss.