Think Three Times: The Message That Broke the Negotiation

The opening lines of this negotiation read like customer service, not crime.

“Welcome! We are ready to help you.”
“Our data is encrypted. Is there a way to get it back?”

Within a few exchanges, the “help” is priced at 900,000 dollars. The attackers bundle everything into a single offer: pay and you get a decryptor for the whole network, a file tree of what was stolen, and a log claiming the data has been wiped. Refuse, and they promise media exposure and sale of your information to “interested parties.”

Then they introduce the real mechanic of this case—discounts.

“The faster you pay the better for pricing – you can get discounts.
So be wise and don't waste each others time.”

From that moment forward, the negotiation stops being a simple ransom demand and becomes a designed discount game.

900K And A “Quick Pay” Deal

The attackers do not just throw out a ransom figure; they build a story around it. The initial 900,000 dollar ask is framed as the natural cost of getting life back to normal: unlock everything, understand what was taken, and erase the traces. The “quick pay” discount is positioned as a win‑win—if the victim moves fast, they get 100,000 off the top.

The victim leans into that framing by engaging politely and asking for a better deal:

“Ok. What kind of discount can we get?”

This question might feel like taking initiative, but it quietly accepts the attacker’s price universe. The debate is no longer “pay or not,” but “how much of a discount will they give us if we behave well and move quickly?” That is exactly where the attackers want the conversation.

The 48‑hour window and the “don’t waste each others time” line weaponize the clock. Verification, legal review, insurance consultation, board briefings—all of the things a mature organization should do—are recast as unnecessary delay that will cost you money. Once the victim accepts that speed equals savings, the attackers control the range of possible outcomes.

“Best And Final”: The 150K Line In The Sand

The victim’s strongest move comes early. After hearing the 900K demand and the 100K fast‑pay discount, they signal both financial limits and a willingness to walk away:

They propose 150,000 dollars, call it their “best and final,” and even question whether they really need decryption at all compared to rebuilding from backups. On the surface, this looks like a power play. The victim sounds decisive, sets a hard ceiling, and implies that if the gang does not cooperate, they will simply eat the rebuild cost and move on.

But the attackers push back immediately:

“You may refuse to pay this your choice. Then we'll release your hacking information…
We took a step to meet. Now it's your turn.”

That “now it’s your turn” line flips the script. In their telling, the criminals have already been reasonable by offering a discount. The victim is now expected to show “reasonableness” in return by moving their number closer to the anchor. And crucially, the victim’s own behavior soon proves that expectation correct.

They start to walk back “best and final,” promising to see if they can “justify any higher expense,” and later float 250,000 and then 325,000 dollars. Every increase tells the attackers that the initial line in the sand was not real. The victim thought they were controlling the negotiation with a firm ceiling; in practice, they were just revealing how much more they were willing to pay.

Proof Of Decryption: Confidence Without Control

While the numbers move, the attackers play another standard card: technical reassurance. The victim uploads small encrypted files—logos, configuration files—and asks if they can be decrypted. The attackers return clean versions and short instructions, proving they can undo the damage.

From the victim’s point of view, this looks like gaining control. They have “validated” the decryptor and confirmed that paying could be faster than rebuilding. They tell the attackers they “would prefer to decrypt rather than going through a rebuild,” and even mention they have already identified a company that can convert a wire transfer into Bitcoin.

In reality, this proof does not shift power; it removes doubt. Once the victim believes the decryptor works, the main emotional barrier to paying disappears. The attackers know this and use it to harden their position: the victim has seen that decryption is possible, has admitted they prefer it to restoration, and has demonstrated they can access hundreds of thousands of dollars. The only question left is how far they can be pushed.

When Aggression Reclaims The Negotiation

The real turning point is not a number; it is a change in tone.

After the victim offers 325,000 dollars and tries to frame it as a reasonable middle ground, the attackers respond with open irritation and explicit escalation:

“If you delay the negotiations, on Monday we will release information about the fact of hacking your network.
We went to your meeting, gave you a good discount. You started pulling time and making us brains. We don't like it.
Measures will follow to sober you up. Think three times before you start playing script games with us.”

In one short sequence, a few key things happen:

• The attackers threaten immediate reputational damage (public disclosure of the hack).
• They reframe the victim’s counter‑offers as “script games,” not genuine attempts to reach a deal.
• They directly warn that further negotiation will trigger punishment.

This is where the power dynamic snaps back into focus. Up to this point, the victim appeared to be steering: declaring “best and final,” adjusting offers, asking about timelines, and setting their own internal deadlines. Once the attackers apply aggression and a concrete threat, that illusion of control collapses.

Immediately after this warning, the attackers deliver a new “final” price:

“We'll go to your meeting. Price $450,000 That's the minimum and that's for sure.
$450,000 and we agree.”

And the victim folds:

“Ok. We will work on payment now.”

The moment the attackers raised the stakes—threatening public disclosure, accusing the victim of playing games, and laying down a hard minimum—the victim’s negotiating posture disappeared. There is no further bargain, no attempt to hold onto 325K, and no renewed mention of rebuilding from backups. The final decision is not, “Is 450K better than rebuilding?” It is, “How quickly can we pay 450K and be done?”

The victim thought “best and final” and incremental raises meant they were driving the negotiation. The attackers proved otherwise when they chose to step up the aggression.

The Discount Staircase: From 900K To 450K

On paper, going from 900,000 to 450,000 dollars looks like a huge win for the victim. They secured a 50% discount from the initial ask, plus the decryptor, file tree, and deletion log. But viewed through the lens of anchoring and behavior, the story is less comforting.

• The attackers controlled the starting point and the pace of every major drop.
• The victim repeatedly raised their own “final” number, signaling more money was available.
• The decisive move came when the attackers turned on aggression and threatened reputational damage.

In the end, the final price sits much closer to the attackers’ world than to the victim’s original 150K ceiling. The criminals also get exactly what they wanted operationally: a large Bitcoin payment routed through a third party, completed under time pressure, with the victim effectively locked into their script.

What This Case Teaches

This transcript is a simple but sharp illustration of how quickly power can shift in ransomware negotiations:

• Anchors matter more than feelings. Once 900K is on the table, every number feels relative to it. If your team does not anchor itself to real rebuild costs and risk calculations, you will slowly slide toward the attacker’s universe.
• “Best and final” only works if you behave like it. The attacker will test whether your ceiling is real. If you raise it once, they’ll assume you will raise it again.
• Aggression often arrives late, on purpose. Attackers may stay polite while extracting information about your finances and preferences. When they decide they’ve learned enough, they escalate threats to lock in their floor.
• Sense of control is fragile. Asking questions, proposing numbers, and getting proof of decryption feels like control, but the true test is what happens when the other side says “minimum and that’s for sure.”

The lesson is not simply “never move off your first number.” It is to treat negotiation as a planned discipline rather than an improvisation under stress. Decide in advance who can change your ceiling, what signals you will (and will not) send about your finances, and how you will respond when the attackers stop being “ready to help you” and start warning you to “think three times” before you keep playing the discount game.